Towards a Power-Oriented Environmental Multilateralism: Rethinking Cooperation in an Age of Rivalries

The return of war to the European continent, the multiplication of tensions across the Middle East and Asia, and the gradual fragmentation of the global economy are shaping a new era in international relations. This emerging order is marked by the reassertion of sovereignty and the renewed centrality of power politics. In this context, multilateralism appears increasingly fragile—if not marginalised. Environmental multilateralism in particular—grounded in the collective management of global commons—seems especially vulnerable to this conflict-driven reconfiguration of the international system.

A dominant interpretation traditionally opposes two dynamics: on the one hand, war, which divides, hierarchises, and confronts; on the other, environmental cooperation, which requires coordination, trust, and long-term projection. From this perspective, rising geopolitical tensions would mechanically lead to a decline in climate ambition and a weakening of multilateral frameworks. However, this view rests on a restrictive conception of multilateralism, understood as a homogeneous, consensual, and depoliticised space, detached from power dynamics.

Such a conception does not reflect either historical reality or contemporary developments. International institutions, such as United Nations, do not eliminate rivalries; they organise, structure, and sometimes prolong them in less visible forms. The environmental field is no exception. It has become a key arena for the redeployment of power strategies.

The ecological transition, as a systemic transformation of productive, energy, and technological structures, directly affects growth trajectories, industrial specialisation, and economic dependencies. As such, it cannot be dissociated from long-standing dynamics of international competition. Climate policies are no longer limited to environmental regulation; they are now embedded in broader strategies aimed at securing supply chains, advancing geostrategic positioning, reshoring industrial capacities, and controlling critical technologies and minerals.

In this context, environmental multilateralism is not disappearing—it is transforming. This transformation is first reflected in the fragmentation of cooperation frameworks. Large-scale universal negotiations, often slow and weakly binding, are increasingly complemented—or replaced—by more restricted formats: coalitions of willing states, climate clubs, and technological partnerships. These allow for greater responsiveness, but at the cost of reduced inclusiveness and an increased risk of normative fragmentation.

This evolution is also characterised by the growing instrumentalisation of environmental tools for economic and industrial purposes. Environmental standards are becoming instruments of trade regulation—and, at times, tools of industrial policy. They shape market access, direct investment flows, and contribute to redefining comparative advantages. In this context, biodiversity and natural resources are no longer merely objects of cooperation; they are emerging as key vectors of economic and strategic hierarchy in the global order to come.

This trend is particularly visible in the strategies of major powers, including the United States, the European Union, and increasingly actors from the Global South—most notably China, but also resource-rich African states. All are now mobilising the environmental agenda as a strategic lever for both domestic transformation and external influence, albeit according to different timelines and models. Climate policies are thus becoming instruments of power, at the core of ongoing geoeconomic reconfigurations.

This leads to what may be described as a “conflictualisation of cooperation”—an evolution that appears inevitable in a context of multiple, overlapping crises. States continue to negotiate, coordinate, and produce common norms, but these processes are now permeated by explicit dynamics of rivalry. Cooperation does not disappear; it becomes strategic.

This observation calls for moving beyond the simplistic alternative between decline and resilience of environmental multilateralism. Rather than remaining unchanged, it is undergoing a profound reconfiguration driven by transformations in the international system. This should not be understood as a weakening, but as a structural mutation.

This transformation is partly explained by the nature of ecological interdependencies. Unlike certain economic dependencies, these cannot easily be bypassed, relocated, or substituted. No state can, on its own, stabilise the climate, preserve biodiversity, or maintain fundamental biogeochemical balances. This constraint gives environmental multilateralism a form of structural resilience: even in a context of heightened rivalry, states remain compelled to cooperate—at least minimally—in order to avoid major systemic human and economic costs.

The challenge, therefore, is no longer to preserve an environmental multilateralism conceived as a depoliticised space of cooperation, but to rethink its foundations. This implies fully acknowledging its embeddedness in power dynamics, while recognising the limits imposed by ecological constraints.

From this perspective, a new framework could emerge, based on an unprecedented articulation between sovereignty and global constraint. State sovereignty would not disappear, but would be partially redefined by planetary boundaries as established by science. Cooperation would no longer rely solely on converging interests, but would operate within an integrated framework in which certain ecological constraints become structural parameters of political action.

Such a model would require moving beyond the current hybridisation of cooperation and competition, towards a more systemic integration of environmental issues into global governance. It would also entail strengthening central regulatory spaces capable of articulating environmental norms, economic imperatives, and geopolitical balances—particularly within the United Nations system.

At the same time, this transformation calls for a reconfiguration of domestic policy architectures. Defence, diplomacy, and environmental policies can no longer be conceived in isolation. Resource-related issues—whether critical minerals, water, or land—are now central strategic variables within power dynamics. Rising tensions around these resources are already visible. According to the International Energy Agency, global demand for critical minerals—such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel—could increase by a factor of four to six by 2040. Since 2022, energy prices have experienced sharp increases, with oil prices temporarily exceeding $120 per barrel, while gas prices in Europe rose five- to tenfold at the peak of the crisis. These trends foreshadow new forms of geopolitical conflict likely to shape international relations in the decades ahead.

In this context, environmental multilateralism appears less as a remnant of a declining liberal international order than as one of the laboratories of an emerging—albeit still uncertain—global order. Its transformation is not a normative choice, but a systemic necessity.

Far from being incompatible with power politics, it may instead become one of its central vectors—provided it is reimagined as both a tool of cooperation and a structuring force within the international system. In this regard, Europe holds a particular capacity to position itself as both a normative and strategic actor in this transformation. This will, however, require its ability to align environmental ambition with a fully geopolitical understanding of ongoing global shifts.

Economics, geopolitics, and environmental issues can no longer be treated as separate domains of strategic thinking. Their disconnection creates significant risks for national security, with direct consequences for health, education, agriculture, food systems, and essential services.

In this respect, the potential economic impact of a temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz remains a particularly instructive case study.